The November 1, 1954 Declaration represents the foundational text of the Algerian Revolution. It urges the Algerian people to free themselves from colonialism through armed struggle, with the ultimate objective of achieving independence and recovering popular sovereignty. This Declaration aims to restore a sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state, rooted in Islamic principles and guaranteeing respect for all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religious creed. A call that strongly resonated with a people enslaved on their own land and who thus had to stand up against oppression by engaging in armed conflict.
For millions of Algerians, the November Declaration is more than an appeal from a new clandestine political party specified to a populace still subdued by the Indigenous Code, decimated by misery and poverty, and crushed by ignorance. Certainly, the declaration calls for national unity, the unification of ranks and ideologies, and above all to rise against oppression and trigger armed struggle as a last resort against the colonial system.
It must be said that this text was consistently the fundamental reference for the primary leaders of the Revolution throughout the war of liberation, even after the holding of the Soummam Congress two years later.
This declaration accompanying the outbreak of armed struggle was drafted by the six main leaders of the Revolution’s launch, namely the historical chiefs: Mohamed Boudiaf, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Mustapha Benboulaid, Krim Belkacem, Didouche Mourad, and Rabah Bitat. Three of these leaders lived to see independence, while the other three were either assassinated by the French military or killed during clashes in the maquis.
Yet, for many historians, the goals inscribed in this first FLN manifesto were never achieved. Despite the enormous sacrifices of the population and the recovery of sovereignty following the 1962 self-determination referendum, the realization of sacred principles was never reached nor fulfilled.
What had happened in the meantime? For historians, two major facts caused the failure of building this “democratic and social state within the framework of Islamic principles.” The first is directly linked to the war of leaderships between chiefs or clans. The quest for personal power and the emergence of internal opposition in certain wilayas completely scrambled agendas and perspectives. These conflicts pushed the GPRA (provisional government) to tender its resignation for fear that an even deadlier civil war would break out on freshly liberated territory.
In fact, the GPRA never handed over power, and the forced arrangements made in Tripoli, Libya, were never respected. This Congress, which was supposed to issue a political roadmap signed by all currents that joined the FLN in its liberation and independence war, ended in a fizzle. It was during these moments of tension and quarrels that most GPRA leaders, like those from the interior, understood that the battle for the “spoils of war” had just begun.
Since then, the GPRA—which negotiated the Evian Accords and controlled the transition with the “Rocher Noir” government—was forced to let go. According to its last president, Benyoucef Benkhedda, there was no chance to call for dialogue because refusals were systematic. According to his words, published in his memoirs or public interventions, finding a compromise with the “Oujda” clan and the border army was no longer possible. The gap was immense.
By throwing in the towel, the GPRA wanted to preserve the lives of the seven million Algerians who survived a fierce, savage, and destructive war. The population was martyred, exhausted, and dispossessed. After so many decades of sacrifices and deprivation, and the negation of their identity, they aspired to live fully in recovered freedom, justice, and respect for fundamental rights, reaching toward progress and modernity.
======Difficult Reconciliation
Or perhaps the temptation of absolute power was strong. Gone was the principle of collegiality in responsibility, decision-making, management, and the organization of military, political, and diplomatic resistance that had triumphed since the beginning of the revolution.
The process of handing over power between the GPRA and the winner or winners of the first free and democratic post-independence general elections was bypassed by this temptation of power. The creation of the Constituent Assembly, an essential demand of certain nationalist leftist currents, was not retained in the context of the era.
Divisions and fractures were enormous. Certain historical leaders brandished a new logic, wielding the principle of historical legitimacy, like Krim Belkacem, who was nonetheless Benkhedda’s vice-president. The latter endeavored to rally the central regions by dispatching a former Wilaya 4 official, Colonel Boualem Dehiles (Sadek), into Algeria with the mission of securing the capital’s entrances. He decided to make changes during the ceasefire. He was rapidly disavowed by the GPRA, and ultimately Colonel Sadek’s authority was called into question while the ZAA (Autonomous Zone of Algiers) remained under GPRA trusteeship until the July 27, 1962 coup d’force by Wilaya 4 against the ZAA chief.
The political and military disavowal was a clear message to Krim. This episode would prove decisive thereafter, because the takeover of the capital by Wilaya 4 units was already an attitude at odds with the resolutions of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution in Tripoli, which stipulated that the ALN as a whole should convert into a professional army.
The FLN Political Bureau reacted and denounced it. The Oujda clan, based in Morocco and later Tlemcen, grasped the stakes of controlling the capital and launched into another mobilization, defying all other spheres of the revolution.
This was the crisis of the summer that shook the entire country, pushing all factions to the brink of conflagration before the population decided to take to the streets with the famous demonstrations, “Sbaâ s’nine barakat” (Seven years is enough). And it is certainly this popular reaction that is considered the second historical fact that changed the game.
This conflict between Wilaya 4 units—formed essentially of new “Marsiens” recruits (referring to March 19, the ceasefire date), inexperienced and lacking modern weaponry—was swiftly crushed by the troops of the border army, which were better equipped and more numerous. It was the latter that entered the capital with tanks. Thus, a new legitimacy installed itself, one that the deceased historical leaders contested politically and military, like that of Ait Ahmed’s FFS, or Boudiaf, and later by the communists.